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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
fully protects the insurer since it fails to allow recovery if the termi-
nated breach in any way affects the loss, and it recognizes the right of
the insurer to declare a forfeiture at the time of the breach if he so
desires.2 3 A just and equitable rule may be entirely abrogated by
unsympathetic or strict application, and the instant case seems to
represent a rather strict application.
WALKER Y. WORTH, JR.
Liens-Priority of Federal Tax Claims Over Inchoate Liens-
Difference in Equity Receivership and Bankruptcy
A corporation was adjudged insolvent and a receiver appointed to
liquidate the assets. On the question of priority of payment between
federal tax claims under Section 3466 of the United States Revised
Statutes' and the employees' liens for wages under G. S. 55-136,2 the
North Carolina Supreme Court held the federal claim was to be given
priority.3
Section 3466 of the United States Revised Statutes, providing for
priority of payment of debts due the United States, applies when the
insolvent has been divested of ownership of his property.4 The divest-
2Globe & Rutgers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Pruitt, 188 Ark. 92, 64 S. W. 2d 91
(1933) ; Aetna Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 213 Ind. 44, 10 N. E. 2d 601 (1937).
131 U. S. C. §191 (1946) : "Whenever any person indebted to the United
States is insolvent or whenever the estate of any deceased debtor in the hands of
the executors or administrators, is insufficient to pay all the dbts due from the
deceased, the debts due to the United States shall be first satisfied; and the priority
established shall extend as well to cases in which a debtor not having sufficient
property to pay all his debts, makes a voluntary assignment thereof, or in which
the estate and effects of an absconding, concealed, or absent debtor, are attached
by process of law, as to cases in which an act of bankruptcy is committed."
2 . C. GEN. STAT. §55-136 (1943) : "In case of the insolvency of a corpora-
tion, partnership, or individual, all persons doing labor or service of whatever
character in its regular employment have a lien upon the assets thereof for the
amount of wages due to them for all labor, work, and services rendered within two
months next preceding the date when proceedings in insolvency were actually
instituted and begun .... which lien is prior to all other liens that can be acquired
against such assets."
3 Leggett v. Southeastern People's College, Inc., 234 N. C. 595, 68 S. E. 2d
263 (1951).
"Before the priority under Section 3466 attaches, the insolvency must be mani-
fested in one of the modes specified under the section. In addition, "Under this
act these rules have been clearly established: First, no lien is created; second,
the priority established can never attach while the debtor continues the owner and
in possession of the property, though he may be unable to pay all his debts; third,
no evidence can be received of the insolvency of the debtor until he has been
divested of his property in one of the modes stated; and fourth, whenever the
debtor is thus divested of his property, the person who thus becomes invested with
the title is thereby made a trustee for the United States. . . ." Beaston v. Farm-
ers' Bank 12 Pet. 102, 133 (U. S. 1838) ; Bramwell v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty
Co., 269 U. S. 483 (1926) ; United States v. Oklahoma, 261 U. S. 253 (1923) ;
Bishop v. Black, 233 N. C. 333, 64 S. E. 2d 167 (1951). The priority attaches




ing of the property of the insolvent such as will call into play the priority
of the United States under Section 3466 is commonly obtained in an
equity receivership, since distribution of the estate in bankruptcy is
controlled by the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.5
The North Carolina decision is in accord with the interpretation of
this section by the federal courts, which gives debts due the United
States superiority over all liens which are not specific and perfected
regardless of the time when such liens arise." The federal courts have
been reluctant to qualify liens competing with federal claims as specific
and perfected 7 and will do so only where the lien is definite in respect
to the identity of the lienor s the amount of the lien,0 and the property
to which the lien attaches, 0 and where all the steps necessary to com-
plete the lien have been taken. 1 In the instant case, the court found
that the lien of the employees for wages under G. S. 55-136 did not
attach to specific property and in effect created only a priority of pay-
ment which must be subordinated to the federal priority granted by
section 3466.12
'A consent receivership amounts to a voluntary assignment which calls section
3466 into play. United States v. Butterworth-Judson Corp., 269 U. S. 504 (1926) ;
Price v. United States, 269 U. S. 492 (1926). Section 3466 is not applicable to
give the government priority in bankruptcy. Guaranty Title & Trust Co. v. Title
Guaranty Co., 224 U. S. 152 (1912).
'United States v. Security Trust and Savings Bank, 340 U. S. 47 (1950);
Illinois v. Campbell, 329 U. S. 362 (1946); United States v. Waddill, 323 U. S.
352 (1945); United States v. Texas, 314 U. S. 480 (1941); United States v.
Knott, 298 U. S. 544 (1936); New York v. Maclay, 288 U. S. 290 (1933);
Spokane County v. United States, 279 U. S. 80 (1921); Thelluson v. Smith, 2
Wheat. 396 (U. S. 1817). See Bishop v. Black, 233 N. C. 333, 64 S. E. 2d 167
(1951). Federal priority under section 3466 does not override a prior mortgage,
United States v. Hooe, 3 Cranch 73 (U. S. 1805); nor a prior judgment plus
execution and levy, Conard v. Atlantic Insurance Co., 1 Pet. 386, 442-44 (U. S.
1828); Thelluson v. Smith, 2 Wheat. 396, 496 (U. S. 1817).
" See Rogge, The Differences in the Priority of the United States in Bank-
ruptcy and in Equity Receiverships, 43 HARv. L. REv. 251 (1929) ; Note, 29 N. C.
L. REv. 293 (1951); Note, 56 YALE L. J. 1258 (1947).
" United States v. Knott, 298 U. S. 544, 550 (1936) (creditors to benefit from
deposit of securities with state official not ascertained).
'United States v. Waddill, 323 U. S. 353 (1945) (amount of landlord's lien
for future rent uncertain) ; United States v. Texas, 314 U. S. 480, 485-86 (1941)
(amount of state gasoline taxes unsettled).
" Illinois v. Campbell, 329 U. S. 362 (1946); United States v. Waddill, 323
U. S. 352 (1945) ; Thelluson v. Smith, 2 Wheat. 396 (U. S. 1817) (general judg-
ment on land). Section 3466 priority is superior to the lien of a docketed judg-
ment unless levy of execution on the judgment has proceeded far enough to take
specific land or othei property out of the possession of the debtor. Conard v.
Atlantic Insurance Co., 1 Pet. 386, 442-444 (U. S. 1828); Thelluson v. Smith, 2
Wheat. 396 (U. S. 1817); United States v. Sullivan, 19 F. Supp. 695 (W. D.
N. Y. 1937). See In re Gruner, 295 N. Y. 510, 68 N. E. 2d 514 (1946) ; Spokane
Merchant's Assn. v. State, 15 Wash. 2d 186, 130 P. 2d 373 (1942); cf. In re
Meyer's Estate, 159 Pa. Super. 296, 48 A. 2d 210 (1946).
"United States v. Security Trust and Savings Bank, 340 U. S. 47 (1950);
United States v. Waddill, 323 U. S. 352 (1945); County of Spokane v. United
States, 279 U. S. 80 (1929) ; Conard v. Atlantic Insurance Co., 1 Pet. 386 (U. S.
1828). See Bishop v. Black, 233 N. C. 333, 64 S. E. 2d 167 (1951).
"Accord: United States v. Emory, 314 U. S. 423 (1941); Lerman v. Lincoln
Novelty Co., 130 N. J. Eq. 144, 21 A. 2d 827 (1941).
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. In contrast to the subordination of the lien for wages in receiver-
ship, where the debtor is carried into bankruptcy, claims for wages
earned within three months of the proceedings prevail over tax claims
,of the federal government by express provision of the Bankruptcy
Act.13 This variance between the rights of the wage-earner in receiver-
ship and bankruptcy is illustrative of the general standing of claims in
the two proceedings. Where there are competing non-lien federal
claims,14 it is as a rule beneficial to creditors to have property of an
insolvent debtor distributed in bankruptcy rather than in equity receiver-
ship.
1'
Except as expressly stated in the Bankruptcy Act, bankruptcy pro-
ceedings do not discharge liens upon the property of the debtor. The
trustee takes control of the property of the debtor, but, by virtue of
section 67 of the Act, the property remains subject to liens existing
at the time of the petition.16 The priority granted to federal tax claims
by section 64 of the Act is limited to the property remaining for dis-
tribution among general creditors after payment of all valid liens.'
7
" Section 64(b) of the Bankruptcy Act places wages up to $600 due employees
which were earned within three months of bankruptcy in clause (2) in the order
of priority, whereas taxes are placed in clause (4). 11 U. S. C. §104(a) (1946).
" Section 3466 does not create a lien for the government. See note 4 supra.
1 See Sarner, Correlation of Priority and Lien Rights in the Collection of
Federal Taxes, 95 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 739 (1947) ; Rogge, The Differences it the
Priority of the United States in Bankruptcy and in Equity Receiverships, 43 HARv.
L. REv. 251 (1929) ; Note, 56 YALE L. J. 1258 (1947). The acts which call section
3466 into play will often justify an involuntary petition in bankruptcy. The
applicable act of bankruptcy consists in having made a general assignment for
the benefit of creditors, or, while insolvent, having suffered appointment of a
receiver or trustee put in charge of the debtor's property. 11 U. S. C. §21 (a) (4, 5)
(1946). See 11 U. S. C. §95 (1946) for the provisions as to which creditors may
file petition for bankruptcy. In North Carolina, the power of a court of equity
to appoint a receiver is inherent and not limited by the specific statutory pro-
visions. Receivership is used most commonly (1) to preserve specific property
which is the subject of litigation; (2) to tide a person over a temporary period
of financial embarrassment; and (3) to prevent preferences and to assure the
equitable distribution of the assets of an insolvent. Sinclair v. Moore Central R.R.,
228 N. C. 389, 49 S. E. 2d 555 (1947). See also: Kelly v. McLamb, 182 N. C.
158, 108 S. E. 435 (1921) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. §§1-502, 55-147 (1943).
1' 11 U. S. C. §107 and §110 (1946). City of Richmond v. Bird, 249 U. S.
174 (1919); Guaranty Title & Trust Co. v. Title Guaranty Co., 224 U. S. 152
(1912) ; Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196 U. S. 516 (1905) ; United States v. Samp-
sell, 153 F. 2d 731 (9th Cir. 1946); In re Dunavant, 96 Fed. 542 (W. D. N. C.
1899); Sample v. Jackson, 225 N. C. 380, 35 S. E. 2d 236 (1945); 4 CownUM
BANKRUPTCY §67.02 (14th ed. 1942). The trustee in bankruptcy is vested with all
the rights of a creditor holding a lien by legal or equitable proceedings. 11
U. S. C. §110(c) (1946). The competing lien must meet the requirements of the
state law such as will give it priority over the lien of the trustee. For example,
and unrecorded mortgage will not prevail against the lien of the trustee. M. & J.
Finance Co. v. Hodges, 230 N. C. 580, 55 S. E. 2d 201 (1949).
' City of Richmond v. Bird, 249 U. S. 174, 177 (1919); Lott v. Salsbury, 237
Fed. 191 (4th Cir. 1916) ; In re Tresslar, 20 F. 2d 663 (M. D. Ala 1927) ; In re
Rowe & Bros., 18 F. 2d 658 (W. D. Pa. 1927); In re Caswell Construction Co.,




Furthermore, in contrast to the requirement of a specific and perfected
lien for priority against federal claims in receivership, inchoate general
liens are specifically protected and validated in bankruptcy. Section
67(b) of the Bankruptcy Act allows a statutory lien to prevail against
the trustee in bankruptcy, even though it is not perfected at the time
of the filing of the petition, so long as it is perfected within the period
permitted by applicable lien law.' 8 Such a lien would as a result also
be satisfied before the priority of distribution set up for federal taxes
by section 64. Thus, liens inchoate at the time of the filing of the
petition but subsequently perfected have been allowed payment before
the order of distribution set up by section 64 in the cases of a mechan-
ic's or materialman's lien,19 subcontractor's lien,2 0 and a lien for state
taxes.2' Liens for a liability still contingent 22 or for an amount still
unascertained at the time of the filing of the petition2 have been allowed
validity against the trustee in bankruptcy. In addition, liens obtained
by judicial proceedings, such as garnishment, attachment, and judgment
liens, are allowed unless invalidated by section 67(a) for being obtained
within four months of the petition while the debtor is insolvent.24
Where the federal claim for taxes has been perfected into a lien,
the situation once again changes. After the proper steps to create a
federal tax lien have been taken, the tax lien itself prevails against the
trustee in bankruptcy and against unsecured creditors. 25 Where another
2811 U. S. C. §107(b) (1946): "Statutory liens in favor of employees, con-
tractors, mechanics, landlords, or other classes of persons, and statutory liens
for taxes and debts owing to the United States or any State, may be valid against
the trustee, even though arising or perfected while the debtor is insolvent and
within four months prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy... [or if the
liens] arise but are not perfected before bankruptcy, they may nevertheless be
valid, if perfected within the time permitted by and in accordance with the re-
quirements of the laws creating them." This section has no application to non-
statutory liens. It furnishes no authority for perfection of contractual liens after
bankruptcy proceedings, which is governed by 11 U. S. C. §96 (1950) concerning
preferences. A transfer made for a present consideration within four months of
bankruptcy is not deemed a preference where perfecting (if required) follows
within 21 days or a lesser statutory period (if any).
" In re Taylorcraft Aircraft Corp., 168 F. 2d 808 (6th Cir. 1948); American
Coal Burner Corp. v. Merritt, 129 F. 2d 314 (6th Cir. 1942) ; New York-Brooklyn
Fuel Corp. v. Fuller, 11 F. 2d 802 (2d Cir. 1926) ; In re Grisslar, 136 Fed. 754
(2d Cir. 1905) ; In re Etherton, 88 F. Supp. 874 (S. D. Cal. 1950) ; In re Caswell
Construction Co., 13 F. 2d 667 (N. D. N. Y. 1926); In re McAllister-Newgard
Co., 193 Fed. 265 (D. Minn. 1912); It re Lillington Lumber Co., 132 Fed. 886
(E. D. N. C. 1904).
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Kinney, 291 II. 84, 125 N. E. 730 (1919).
" Delaney v. City and County of Denver, 185 F. 2d 246 (10th Cir. 1950).
" Security Mortgage Co. v. Powers, 278 U. S. 149 (1928).
"In re Knox-Powell-Stockton Co., 100 F. 2d 979 (9th Cir. 1939).
2Section 67(a), Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. §107(a) 1946); 4 CoLLrER,
BAKRUPrTCY §67.07-67.12 (14th ed. 1942).
2z 11 U. S. C. §107(b) (1946). Goggin v. Division of Labor Law Enforce-
ment of California, 336 U. S. 118 (1948) (tax lien superior to wage claim) ; In re
Taylorcraft Aviation Corp., 168 F. 2d 808 (6th Cir. 1948); United States v.
Sampsell, 153 F. 2d 731 (9th Cir. 1946); Dial v. Chatman, 70 F. 2d 21 (4th Cir.
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competing lien is in the picture, the question of priority between the
liens becomes an ordinary contest under applicable lien law independent
of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, since both liens are superior
to the right of the trustee.2 6  In respect to the four classes protected
against the federal tax lien by recordation-purchasers, judgment credi-
tors, mortgagees, and pledgees-the federal lien ranks in accordance with
the general rule, "first in time, first in right," on the basis of recorda-
tion.27 But in respect to all other liens, recent cases indicate that the
tax lien will be given priority over inchoate liens which have not become
specific and perfected, by analogy to the requirement under section 3466
in receivership proceedings.
28
If the analogy of liens under section 3466 in receiverships is to be
carried over in its full vigor to a contest of competing liens outside
receivership, a creditor will gain little from having the debtor carried
into bankruptcy where the federal tax claim has been perfected into a
liefi. Where there is no tax lien in the picture, however, substantial
advantage may result for holders of inchoate liens by going into the
bankruptcy court. Creditors faced with a competing federal tax claim
might well investigate the benefits to be gained from having the estate
of an insolvent debtor liquidated in bankruptcy rather than receivership
proceedings. The instant case appears to have been a situation in point.
DicKsoN MCLEAN, JR.
1934). Section 3670 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. §3670 (1946),
provides for a lien for federal taxes (other than estate and gift taxes) upon all
property of the taxpayer after demand has been made. The liens become effective
as against subsequent purchasers, judgment creditors, mortgagees, and pledgees
from the date of recordation of the lien by virtue of Section 3672. As against all
other parties the federal tax lien is effective from the time the assessment list
is received by the collector. United States v. Sampsell, 153 F. 2d 731 (9th GCr.
1946) ; In re MacKinnon Mfg. Co., 24 F. 2d 156 (7th Cir. 1928) ; United States
v. Record Publishing Co., 60 F. Supp. 194 (N. D. Cal. 1945). The lien for
estate and gift taxes becomes effective against all parties from the date of the
receipt of the assessment list. 26 U. S. C. §§827(a), 1009 (1946) ; Detroit Bank
v. United States, 317 U. S. 329 (1943).2 In re Taylorcraft Aviation Corp., 168 F. 2d 808 (6th Cir. 1948); United
States v. Sampsell, 153 F. 2d 731 (9th Cir. 1946) ; Seymour v. Wildgen, 137 F.
2d 160 (10th Cir. 1943) ; Dial v. Chatman, 70 F. 2d 21 (4th Cir. 1934) ; Lerner
Stores Corp. v. Electric Maid Bake Shops, 24 F. 2d 780 (5th Cir. 1928).
2 United States v. Sampsell, 153 F. 2d 731 (9th Cir. 1946) ; Dial v. Chatman,
70 F. 2d 21 (4th Cir. 1934) ; Ormsbee v. United States, 23 F. 2d 926 (S. D. Fla.
1926).
2United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 340 U. S. 47 (1950);
United States v. Reese, 131 F. 2d 466 (7th Cir. 1942); In re Capital Foundry
Corp., 64 F. Supp. 885 (E. D. N. Y. 1946); Note, 29 N. C. L. REv. 293 (1951).
But cf. United States v. Alabama, 313 U. S. 274 (1941).
